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ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the increasing approximation of EU Member States’ private 
international law rules.  The European Commission issued a proposal (COM 2010 748 FINAL) 
to amend the Brussels I Regulation by inter alia approximating Member States’ subsidiary 
(or residual) jurisdiction rules. The proposal highlights the potential emergence of a third 
wave of European private international law.  In the context of current debates on emerging 
global governance techniques, this paper will briefly appraise the role of conflicts justice in 
coordinating national pluralism and the changing role of private international law as a form 
of secondary rules.  The paper seeks to assess first, whether this aspect of the Commission’s 
proposal could be justified and second, how a third wave of European private international 
law has the longer term objective to re-conceptualise private international law in disputes 
involving non EU defendants brought before the courts of a Member State. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
“Private international law, properly understood, is about determining the most ‘just’ 
distribution of regulatory authority.” 1 
 
Much has been written about the inception and development of the first 2 and second 3 
waves of European private international law rules.  From the inception and eventual 
application of the Brussels Convention 1968, to the second wave of ‘Communitarised’ 4 
private international law by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the introduction of Regulation EC 
44/2001 (hereafter the Brussels I Regulation) ten years ago, the traditional “landscape” 5 of 
private international law has undergone much re-development in the pursuit of a “planned 
and orderly legal parkland.” 6  This paper seeks to explore how recent proposals to 
                                                          
1 A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in 
International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 18; Professor A.Nuyts, 
“Study on Residual Jurisdiction Review of the Member States’ Rules concerning the “Residual Jurisdiction” of 
their courts in Civil and Commercial Matters pursuant to the Brussels I and II Regulations” (Study 
JLS/C4/2005/07-30-CE), 6 July 2007, para 135, 107 referring to C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2004] ECR I-1383 
and Opinion 1/03 of the Court on the competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2006] ECR 
I-1145 (hereinafter ‘the Lugano Opinion’). 
2 GAL Droz, Competence judiciare et effects des jugements dans le Marche Commun (Librarie Dalloz, 1972); IF 
Fletcher, Conflict of Laws and European Community Law (North-Holland Publishers,1982); P Stone, EU Private 
International Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006 and 2010). 
3 PR Beaumont, “European Court of Justice and Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters” (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 223; J Israël, “Conflict of Law 
and the EC after Amsterdam. A Change for the Worse?” (2000) 7 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 81; J Basedow, “The Communitarisation of The Conflict of Laws Under the Treaty of 
Amsterdam” (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 687; O Remien, “European Private International Law, The 
European Community and its Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (2001) 38 Common Market Law 
Review 53; SM Nott, “For Better or Worse? The Europeanisation of the Conflict of Laws” 2002 24 Liverpool Law 
Review 17; Lord Mance, “The Future of Private International Law” (2005) 1 Journal of Private International Law 
185; TC Hartley, “The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of the Common Law of Conflict of Laws” 
(2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 813; A Dickinson, “European Private International Law: 
Embracing New Horizons or Mourning the Past?” (2005) 1 Journal of Private International Law 197; A Fiorini, 
“The Codification of Private International Law in Europe: Could the Community Learn from the Experience of 
Mixed Jurisdictions?” (2008) 12 European Journal of Comparative Law http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-7.pdf 
accessed on 19 April 2012; M Czepelak, “Would We Like to Have a European Code of Private International 
Law?” [2010] European Review of Private Law 705. 
4 O Lando, “Lex Fori in Foro Proprio” (1995) 2 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 359; M 
Warrington, “European Private Law and Comparative Legal Theory: Problems of Europeanisation for 
Comparative Law” in C Joerges and O Gerstenberg (eds),  Private Governance, Democratic Constitutionalism 
and Supranationalism (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1998); 
Beaumont, ibid; J Basedow, “The Communitarisation of The Conflict of Laws Under The Treaty of Amsterdam” 
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 687; BJ Rodger, “The Communitarisation of International Private Law: 
Reform of the Brussels Convention by Regulation” [2001] Juridical Review 59, 69. 
5 A term, it would appear, originally coined by Fletcher, supra n 2 ; Dickinson, supra n 3, 231; A Fiorini, “The 
Evolution of European Private International Law” (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 969. 
6 Fletcher, supra n 2, 273 ; Dickinson, supra n 3, 200. 
approximate 7 subsidiary jurisdiction rules in the Brussels I Regulation illustrate Hay, Lando 
and Rotunda’s concept of the “conflict of laws as a technique of legal integration.” 8  A 
quarter of a century ago, these learned authors argued that differences in Member States’ 
substantive laws - juridical pluralism - was not only “inevitable but to some extent also 
desirable.” 9  They were correct in highlighting the challenge of applying national laws 
grounded upon national traditions and cultures to “trans-frontier transactions.” 10  They also 
argued that in the event such laws hindered the Four Freedoms, the European Community 
would be justified in either replacing such laws or, in the alternative, providing common 
rules of jurisdiction and applicable law. 11   
 
The EU has and continues to exert considerable influence on the conflicts process in both a 
theoretical 12 (vi. the formation and external impact of Europeanised private international 
law rules) and practical (vis interpretative) sense.  At EU level, the move towards 
approximation of private international law rules has been illustrated through the logic of the 
Treaties and the means, method and extent to which approximated rules have been 
proposed and interpreted 13 by the EU Institutions. 14  Such an approach to law making, in 
the absence of a distinct EU Constitution, is indicative of a form of “constitutional ordering,” 
15 designed to correct 16 national and international divergences 17 in private international 
                                                          
7 Articles 81 and 114 TFEU; Tampere Council Recommendations 1999, para 39; P Hay, O Lando and RD 
Rotunda, “ Conflict of Laws as a Technique of Legal Integration” in M Cappelletti, M Seccombe and J Weiler 
(eds), Integration Through Law, Europe and the American Federal Experience (Walter de Gruyter,  1986), 161; R 
Zimmerman, “Savigny’s Legacy – Legal History, Comparative Law and the Emergence of a European Legal 
Science” in TG Watkin (ed), The Europeanisation of Law (Committee of Comparative Law and the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1998), 8; C Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law 
(Routledge, 2008), 168. 
8 Hay, Lando and Rotunda, ibid. 
9 Ibid, 161. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Dickinson, supra n 3, 199; S. Barriatti, Cases and Materials on EU Private International Law (OHart 
Publishing, 2011), 51. 
13 Article 329 TFEU; A Fiorini, “Harmonising the Law Applicable to Divorce and Legal Separation–Enhanced 
Cooperation as the Way Forward?” (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1143, 1154. 
14 For a reflection on recent case law of the CJEU and a overview of the proposed Recast see B Hess, “The 
Brussels I Regulation: Recent Case Law of the Court of Justice and The Commission’s Proposed Recast” (2012) 
49 Common Market Law Review  1075. 
15 Mills, supra n 1, 182. 
16C Joerges, “Sozialstaatlichkeit in Europe? A Conflict-of-Laws Approach to the Law of the EU and the 
Proceduralisation of Constitutionalisation” (2009) 10 German Law Journal 335; H Muir Watt, “The Role of the 
Conflict of Laws in European Private Law” in Twigg-Flesner, supra n 7; Mills, supra n 1. 
17 Fiorini, supra n 3, 1. 
law rules.  Four decades ago, the first generation or wave of Europeanised private 
international law hinted at the harmonisation of private international law. However, such 
measures were limited to reducing formalities in the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments between the Member States. 18  At that time, the EU undertook an 
approach which focussed on securing common, 19 but not entirely exclusive, rules of 
jurisdiction and applicable law.  The ‘second generation’ of European private international 
law rules emerged as a result of the Treaty of Amsterdam.  According to Nott, the objective 
of Communitarisation via the Treaty of Amsterdam reflected “the long-term benefit of the 
Community rather than […] the internal coherence of the conflicts systems of individual 
Member States.” The current legal process of Europeanisation has continued to 
“penetrat(e) national systems of governance.” 20  The EU has sought to secure a unified 
position for the benefit of the internal market, as illustrated in the most recent proposals for 
common contract laws  21 and optional rules for (currently) cross-border sales contracts. 22 
In the field of conflict of laws, the EU has sought to approximate Member States’ laws 
through the introduction of applicable law rules for contractual obligations, non-contractual 
obligations, succession, and divorce and separation. 23  The “pressure [for Member States] 
                                                          
18 Barriatti, supra n 12. 
19 A Furrer, “European Law without Peak and Centre? Observations on the Europeanization Process in Private 
Law Towards a Supranational Multi-level System” in C Joerges and O Gestenberg (eds), Private Governance, 
Democratic Constitutionalism and Supranationalism (Office for Official Publications, Luxembourg, 1998), 167. 
20 “‘Europeanization’ [...] is at heart about the consequences of European integration for domestic political 
systems” in K Dyson and KH Goetz, “Living with Europe: Power, Constraint, and Constestation” in K Dyson and 
KH Goetz (eds), Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint ( Oxford University Press, 2003), 12; A Stone 
Sweet, “Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community”, EUI Working Paper RSC No.95/38,  1; S Bulmer, 
“Theorizing Europeanization” in P Graziano and MP Vink (eds), Europeanization New Research Agendas 
(Palgrave, 2007), 47 (word modified for syntax); T Flockhart, “Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of 
European Norms across Time and Space” (2010) 48 Journal of Common Market Studies 787.  The Opinion of 
the Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
COM (2010) 748 final/2-2010/0383 (COD), 5 May 2011, para 3.1 states that “(T)he revision should also help to 
create the necessary legal environment for the European economy to recover.” 
21 C von Bar and E Clive, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame 
of Reference (DCFR) (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
22 “Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council on a Common European Sales Law,” Brussels, 
11.10.2011, COM (2011) 635 final.  See further H Schulte-Nölke, “The Way Forward in European Consumer 
Contract Law: Optional Instrument instead of Further Deconstruction of National Private Laws” in Twigg-
Flesner, supra n 7; M Kenny, L Gillies and J Devenney, “The EU Optional Instrument: Absorbing the Private 
International Implications of a Common European Sales Law” (2011) 13 Yearbook of Private International Law 
315. 
23 The first area to be subject to the enhanced cooperation procedure for matters external to the EU acquis; 
Editorial, “Enhanced Cooperation: A Union á taille réduite or á porte tournante?” (2011) 48 Common Market 
Law Review 317. 
to participate” 24 in these EU law-making processes is indicative of the future form and basis 
of EU private international law.   
 
On 1 March 2012, the Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters 
(EC 44/2001) became ten years old. A process of review of that Regulation began five years 
after its introduction. One of the key aspects that arose out of the review of the Regulation 
was the appropriateness of Member States’ subsidiary jurisdiction rules. 25 As readers of the 
Journal will appreciate under the current Regulation, Member States’ subsidiary (or 
residual) jurisdiction rules apply to a civil or commercial matter in broadly two ways. These 
rules may apply either in their entirety, for example if a Member State originally opted out 
of Title IV TEU. 26 Alternatively, they may apply in part, for example if a cross-border dispute 
was outside the scope of the Regulation rationae materiae, or if the defendant was not 
domiciled in an EU Member State and an EU court does not have exclusive jurisdiction by 
virtue of Articles 22 or 23 of the Brussels I Regulation. 27  As Hess affirms, the Brussels I 
Regulation permits the application of all subsidiary jurisdiction rules, even those which are 
exorbitant. 28  On 14 December 2010, the European Commission released a proposal for the 
replacement of the Brussels I Regulation (known and referred to as the ‘Recast’).29   The 
proposed Recast highlights that, as far as the Commission is concerned, the continued 
willingness to respect and facilitate judicial pluralism and by implication, exorbitant bases of 
jurisdiction, is tangential to approximating conflicts justice 30  in fulfilment of Treaty 
objectives, social welfare and the “respect for fundamental rights.” 31  As far as the 
Commission is concerned, the desire to achieve uniformity of decision in furtherance of 
                                                          
24A Fiorini, supra n 5, 980, words added for syntax; or as “commitment to the institution”; K Featherstone, 
“Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe’” in K Featherstone and CM Radaelli (eds), The Politics of 
Europeanization (Oxford University Press,  2003), 3, 6. 
25 As a set of “secondary” national rules; Mills, supra n 1. 
26 Nott, supra n 3, 10. Denmark did this but became party to the Brussels I Regulation on 1 July 2007 through 
an international agreement between the EU and Denmark, see OJ 2006 L120/22 and P Beaumont and P 
McEleavy, Anton’s Private International Law (SULI, 2011), 213. 
27 Article 4, Brussels I Regulation. 
28 Hess, supra n 14, 1105. 
29 COM 2010 748 FINAL COD 2010/0383 14 December 2010. 
30 Mills alludes to the “European regime” as a “collective enterprise”: supra n 1 , 16. 
31 K Lenaerts, “The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” 
(2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 255. Hess, supra n 14, 1078-79. 
continued integration of the EU acquis 32 has overridden the willingness to continually 
accommodate national divergences 33 in subsidiary jurisdiction rules, where they remain.   
 
Far from being an “inward looking organisation,” 34 the EU Commission’s original  proposal 
highlights the EU’s objective (in fulfilment of the Stockholm Programme) by extending the 
EU acquis 35 through the approximation of subsidiary jurisdiction not previously within the 
remit of the Brussels I Regulation.  Accordingly, the aim of this paper is two-fold. First, the 
paper will examine the Commission’s original proposal to replace Member States’ subsidiary 
jurisdiction rules in the Recast 36 of the Brussels I Regulation and second, to assess how that 
aspect of the proposal highlights the continuing objective towards Europeanised private 
international law rules.37  It should be observed at the outset that on 24 October 2012 the 
Council of the European Union rejected that aspect of the Commission’s proposal by 
approving the amendments proposed by the European Parliament. . 38 Despite the current 
lack of endorsement, a key question deriving from the Commission’s proposal is what values 
inherent to private international law were sought to be  replaced 39 by the original proposal 
and – going forward - what values should be ascribed to approximated, European private 
international law rules? 40  As Fentiman reminds us,  
                                                          
32 A Weiner, “The Embedded Acquis Communautaire: Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance” (1998) 
4 European Law Journal 294 (word in brackets removed for syntax). 
33COM (2010) 748 FINAL at p.3; cf in preference of pluralism see Fiorini, supra n 5. 
34 Nott, supra n 3, 11. 
35 R Petrov and P Kalinichenko, “Europeanization of Third Country Judiciaries Through the Application of the 
EU Acquis: The Cases of Russia and the Ukraine” (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 325. 
36 COM (2010) 748 FINAL; Justice and Home Affairs Council, 3135th Council Meeting, Press Release 18498/11, 
PRESSE 11-49, Background, Brussels, 12 December 2011, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/11/491&format=HTML&aged=0&lg=en&guiL
anguage=en (accessed 26 March 2012), 11. 
37 Dickinson, supra n 3, 200; Fiorini, n 5, 969; J Weber, “Universal Jurisdiction and Third States in the Reform of 
the Brussels I Regulation” (2001) 75 Rabels Zeitschrift 620. Hess, supra n 14. 
38 Council of the European Union, “Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (recast),” A7-0320/2012, 15 October 2012. See also the earlier Council of the European Union, Report 
“Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters” 2010/0383 (COD), JUSTCIV 209, 1 June 2012. 
Hess, supra n 14, 1112. 
39 Ergo the corresponding impact on the “underestimated […] role and importance of national law,” Furrer, 
supra  n 19, 175.  Punctuation removed for syntax. 
40 Hess, supra n 14, 1111-12. 
“the evolving European regime is subservient to the higher goal of European 
integration. It is not intended to provide optimal conflicts results, but optimal 
integration.” 41  
 
B. APPROXIMATING CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES AS A TECHNIQUE OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
In the tradition of Savigny, the pursuit of conflicts justice has been focussed on a “uniformity 
of result” 42 approach.  This approach has sought to secure favourable outcomes with regard 
to the “process of justice in the foreign court” 43 via rules of jurisdiction and applicable law 
drafted to ensure certainty for litigants in the management of perceived or actual “litigation 
risk.” 44  Mills has defined conflicts justice as meaning fairness through “the international 
system of rights protection.” 45  The theoretical foundations of the conflict of laws and 
conflicts justice are two-fold.  First, conflicts justice provides the normative basis whereby 
sovereign nations determine and assert the limits of their legislative power to prescribe laws 
and their authoritative 46 jurisdictional competence in cross-border matters through the 
application of internalised or commonly agreed second-order rules.  Second, such 
“standards of [conflicts] justice” 47 are established by sovereign nations via the values 
embedded in their substantive laws, which are then in turn supported by second-order 
rules.  The values of conflicts justice, and thereby conflicts rules, are traditionally focussed 
on securing legal certainty 48 for parties involved in cross-border disputes 49 in fulfilment of 
                                                          
41 R Fentiman, “Choice of Law in Europe: Uniformity and Integration” (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 2021, 2051. 
Word in italics for emphasis.  See also M Everson and J Eisner, The Making of a European Constitution, Judges 
and Law Beyond Constitutive Power (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 17 who allude to the “notion of 
‘supranationality’ [which] include(s) a political ideal that sovereign national polities should always be 
constrained in exercising their sovereign powers by the interests and values of other sovereign polities, 
represents Europe’s greatest normative achievement.”  Words added and modified for syntax. 
42 Fentiman, supra n 41. 
43 L Collins, A Briggs, J Harris, JD McClean, C McLachlan and CGJ Morse (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins, The 
Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, 14th edn, 2006), 7. 
44 R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2010), 4. 
45 Mills, supra n 1, 209. 
46 Everson and Eisner, supra n 41, 6. 
47 AE Jaffey, Topics in Choice of Law (The British Institute of International and Comparative Law,  1996), 18. 
Word in brackets added for syntax. 
48 G Kegel, ”Fundamental Approache,”  in K Lipstein (ed), International Encyclopedia of International Law, 
Volume III/1, Private International Law (Mohr Siebeck/ Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011). 
49 APMJ Vonken, “Balancing Processes in International Family Law. On the Determination and Weighing of 
Interests in the Conflicts of Laws and the ‘Openness’ of the Choice of Law System, in Th M De Boer (ed), Forty 
Years On: The Evolution of Post War Private International Law in Europe, Symposium in Celebration of the 40 th 
Anniversary of the Centre of Foreign Law and Private International Law, University of Amsterdam, on 27 
October 1989, (Kluwer, 1990), 178. 
“predictable” 50 outcomes (by the application of certain and predictable jurisdiction rules 
and approximated choice of law rules).  Party autonomy to select the jurisdiction and 
applicable law provides a degree of legal certainty required to alleviate transaction and 
litigation risk. 51   
 
When a dispute contains foreign aspects, a forum is required to balance competing interests 
52 in determining on what basis it may assert jurisdiction and what law should apply.  The 
idea of traditional conflicts justice is underpinned by a “self-contained” 53 pluralist approach 
which seeks to “normative(ly) apprais(e) […] foreign concepts” 54 (ie laws) and coordinate 55 
them within national rules.  Despite such “flexible and subtle” 56 approaches, a pluralist 
approach has been partially replaced by both international and regional unification as “the 
most effective means to achieve uniformity of result” 57 and limiting exorbitant bases of 
jurisdiction.  The unification of private international law has progressed by way of bilateral 
conventions between states and multilateral conventions between groups of states.  Whilst 
participating in and acceding to such unification techniques, Member States have - until the 
EU’s external competence was affirmed by the Court of Justice’s Lugano Opinion 58 - largely 
retained authority and competence to implement and interpret conflict of laws rules 
applicable to cross-border disputes external to the EU.  However, as Fentiman, 59 Muir-Watt 
60 and Mills 61 have all recently remarked, efforts by the European Union at internal 
codification of those laws have shifted from a respect for national pluralism and a desire for 
international unification towards the approximation of such rules at regional level.  The 
objective of this new layer of private international law is to further an approach focussed on 
                                                          
50 Ibid, 176. 
51 Fentiman, supra n 44, 5, 7. 
52 Furrer,  supra n 19, 169, who refers to “parties interests, transaction interests and regulatory interests”; for 
a discussion of the “market function” of private international law see Muir Watt, supra n 16, 54. 
53 Furrer,  supra n 19, 169. 
54Ibid, 168-69.  Words modified and removed for syntax. 
55 Mills, supra n 1, 32. 
56 TM de Boer, “The Relation between Uniform Substantive Law and Private International Law” in AS 
Hartkamp, MW Hesselink, EH Honduis, CE du Perron and JBM Vranken (eds), Towards a European Civil Code 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,  1994), 63. 
57 Ibid. 
58 The Lugano Opinion, supra n 1 and see also CT Kotuby Jr, “External Competence of the European Community 
in the Hague Conference on Private International Law: Community Harmonization and Worldwide Unification” 
[2001] Netherlands International Law Review 1, 17-18. 
59 Fentiman, supra note 41, 2021. 
60 Fentiman, supra nn 41 and 44. 
61 Muir Watt, supra n 16. 
horizontal uniformity of decision across the Member States and the enforcement of mutual 
trust necessary for supporting the “Community order” 62  and “the external congruity of 
decisions.”63 
 
Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union reinforces the continued 
progression towards harmonised judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters in 
pursuit of two broad, and inherently intra-Community, objectives.  First, the Treaty seeks to 
regulate the legal effect of intra-Community relations by ensuring the compatibility of 
private international law rules between the Member States.  The second objective is to 
facilitate greater access to justice ergo greater access to EU laws. 64  This objective requires 
Member States’ private international laws to be approximated.  Whilst the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality legitimise only that which the EU is permitted to regulate in 
accordance with the Treaties, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland still retain their 
ability to ‘opt in’ 65 or maintain their own ‘brand’ -  ergo their own value -  of conflicts 
justice.  Consequently, the Europeanisation of private international law by way of 
approximation, still 66 remains positioned between convergence and full harmonisation. 
 
The emphasis on necessity reflects the timeliness for “re-conceptualising” national private 
international laws as a fully-fledged “sub-category” 67 of EU private law. 68 Whilst the Treaty 
goes some way to shed light on the transfer of competence from the Member States to the 
EU by permitting the “elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil 
proceedings” 69 there is an opinion that a “third level” of private international law rules is 
                                                          
62 Mills, supra n 1, 201. 
63 Furrer, supra n 19, 169. Word italicised for emphasis. 
64 COM (2010) 748 FINAL at 3. 
65 Majone describes this as an example of “selective exit”: G Majone, Europe as the Would-Be World Power: 
The EU at Fifty (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 35.  The United Kingdom and Ireland have elected to 
participate in the replacement of the Brussels I Regulation; European Parliament Draft Report at 12. Denmark 
can only opt in, under the present Treaty regime, to the Brussels I Regulation and the Service Regulation 
through international agreements with the EU but under a new Protocol agreed with the Lisbon Treaty it could 
give itself the power to opt in to any Article 81 TFEU instrument on the same legal basis as Ireland and the UK, 
see Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 26, 20. 
66 Fiorini, supra n 5, 984. 
67 Dickinson, supra n 3, 200. 
68 Something not entirely novel to the subject when one considers its theoretical development; on which see 
further Mills, supra n 1, ch 2. 
69 Article 81(2)(f) TFEU; cf T Kruger, Civil Jurisdiction Rules of the EU and Their Impact on Third States (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 10. 
quantitatively 70  necessary for two reasons. First, where national laws have failed to take 
into account diverging approaches to the allocation of jurisdiction over non-Member State 
domiciliaries in their private international law’ rules 71  and second for the recognition and 
enforcement of third state judgments. 72 Despite the original objective of the Brussels I 
Regulation, the Commission in its proposal argued that continued divergences in Member 
States’ subsidiary jurisdiction rules “create[…] unequal market conditions for companies 
engaged in transactions with parties outside the EU.” 73 The Commission regards the 
elimination of these rules as being entirely compatible with the objectives of the internal 
market.  A related objective is driven by economic considerations which seek to ensure that, 
inter alia through the abolition of exequatur, judgments are enforced effectively between 
the Member States in support of the internal market. 74 
 
1. An Example of the “Purpose” of Approximation: Addressing Divergences in Subsidiary 
Jurisdiction Rules 
It was recently remarked by Mills that “private international law rules are not part of the 
law of each state, not ‘dependent merely upon the arbitrary determination of particular 
States,’ but ‘limitations belonging to the law of nations.’ ” 75 Fresh criticisms have emerged 
of private international law’s emphasis on national considerations and application of 
conflicts justice.  In the realms of choice of law, such criticisms have increasing significance, 
not just for commercial parties who use their knowledge of such rules in assessing 
transactional and litigation risks, but for private parties who wish to assert their right for a 
particular law other than the lex fori to apply to their dispute. 76  The emphasis on the 
(apparent) need 77 to correct deficiencies in national laws – including private international 
laws - is illustrated in Joerges’ recent observations on the competing roles of national social 
                                                          
70 Mills, supra n 1, 178. 
71 Joerges, supra n 16; cf Kruger, supra n 69, 396 who questions the necessity for Member States’ exorbitant 
jurisdiction rules. 
72 A point remarked on by Hess in his assessment of the Recast supra n 14, 1106-07. 
73 A point repeated more than once at COM (2010) 748 FINAL; p.3 and p.11. Word modified for syntax. 
74 Muir Watt, supra n 16, 46, 54; Mills, supra n 1, 178. 
75 Mills, supra n 1, 60. 
76 For example Case C-148/02 Garcia v Belgium [2003] ECR I-11613,Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul [2008] ECR 
I-7639, and Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42. 
77 See EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, “Conflict of Loyalties in the Conflict of Laws: The Cause, The Means and 
The Cost of Harmonisation” (2005) 3 Juridical Review 251, 262 who have questioned the ‘need’ for a 
supranational approach across “all areas.” 
policy and supranationalism in the constitutionalisation of EU law.  Joerges demonstrates 
how the influence of social policy in the Europeanisation process has sought to maintain the 
beliefs and objectives of the Member States’ legal systems.78  The ability of Member States 
to retain their own brand of conflicts justice in jurisdiction rules for non-EU domiciled 
defendants is an example. By seeking to “reflect and replicate conceptions of global 
ordering,” 79 approximation techniques seek to ensure mutual trust between the Member 
States. Mutual trust is achieved (it would seem) by removing deficiencies 80  in current 
national private international laws and replacing those rules with rules designed to facilitate 
uniformity of decision 81 and, by implication, the extension of the EU acquis. 82   
 
C. THE PROPOSAL TO HARMONISE MEMBER STATES’ SUBSIDIARY 
JURISDICTION RULES IN THE RECAST OF THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION (COM 
(2010) 748 FINAL) 
 
On 14 December 2010, the European Commission released a proposal for the replacement 
of the Brussels I Regulation.83  The proposal for revision of the Regulation has been eagerly 
anticipated since both the European Commission’s 2009 Report on the application of the 
Regulation and a Green Paper on its review. 84  Article 73 of the Brussels I Regulation 
confirmed that it was due for revision within five years of its introduction.  The revision of 
the Regulation has been prompted by a number of recent cases, the majority of which have 
considered the internal impact of the Regulation’s application over Member States’ ability 
to assert jurisdiction in the face of previous jurisdiction or arbitration agreements, or to 
restrict proceedings in another Member State. The General study by Professors Hess, 
                                                          
78 Giving resonance to Majone’s observation that in “policy agenda(s) […] in areas […] such as justice and home 
affairs […] national governments enjoy a comparative advantage in terms of expertise and material resources”, 
Majone, supra n 65, 79. Words in brackets removed and added for syntax. 
79 Mills, supra n 1, 28. 
80 For example as Fentiman remarks on the incompatibility of the doctrine of FNC with Article 6 ECHR, supra n 
44, 15 and the ensuing impact on comity (on which see the recent decision of the English Court of Appeal in 
Star Reefers Pool Inc v JFC Group Co Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 14). 
81 An example of Dyson and Goetz’s “adaptive pressures”: in Dyson and Goetz, supra n 20, 15. 
82 Petrov and Kalichenko, supra n 35.  
83 COM (2010) 748 FINAL COD 2010/0383 14 December 2010. 
84 Report COM (2009) 174 FINAL and Green Paper COM (2009) 175 FINAL. 
Pfeiffer and Schlosser 85 together with the “Residual Jurisdiction” study by Professor Nuyts 86 
reviewed the operation of both the jurisdiction rules under the Regulation (the “internal 
impact”) and Member States’ subsidiary jurisdiction rules respectively. 87 The point of the 
Nuyts’ report was to consider whether “the absence of common rules determining 
jurisdiction against defendants domiciled in Third States could jeopardise the application of 
mandatory Community legislation, or the objectives of the Community.” 88 Recent decisions 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter the CJEU) have focussed attention 
not just on acute aspects of the Regulation’s scope and content 89 but crucially the fourth 
corner of Kruger’s “cornerstone” analogy 90  and the impact of Member States’ subsidiary 
jurisdiction rules upon the Regulation.91  Whilst it is fair to say that the operation of the 
Regulation has largely been regarded as effective in its objective towards securing 
uniformity of decision, 92 one of the pivotal and highly contentious issues identified by the 
research in both the General and the Residual Jurisdiction Studies was to what extent 
Member States’ subsidiary 93 jurisdiction rules and their analogous procedural mechanisms 
have conflicted with both the spirit of mutual trust as the internal component of the 
Regulation, and access to justice in the EU courts over disputes concerned with non-EU 
defendants? 94 Adopting the Jenard Report’s approach and Kruger’s analogy, the first 
cornerstone of the Regime applies the domicile of the defendant (actor sequitur forum rei). 
The Regulation is a pyramid structure, with the doctrine of actor sequitur being the central 
                                                          
85 B Hess, T Pfeiffer and P Schlosser, The Brussels I Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, The Heidelberg Report on the 
Application of Regulation Brussels I in 25 Member States (Study JLS/C4/2005/03) (Verlag C.H. Beck,  2008). 
86 Nuyts, supra n 1. 
87 COM (2009) 174 FINAL, supra n 84, 2. 
88 Nuyts, supra n 1, 177. Words italicised for emphasis. 
89 See eg Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565: [2005] 1 AC 101; Case C-116/02 Gasser v MISAT 
[2003] ECR I-14693; and Case C-185/07 Allianz SpA v West Tankers (The Front Comor) [2009] ECR I-663; [2009] 
1 AC 1138. For a brief overview of recent CJEU case law, see Hess, supra n 14. 
90 Kruger, supra n 69; Weber, supra n 37, 620. 
91 J Newton, The Uniform Interpretation of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions (Hart Publishing, 2002), 21; 
Kruger, ibid; R Fentiman, “Civil Jurisdiction and Third States: Owusu and After” (2006) 43 Common Market Law 
Review 705; B Rodger, “Forum non Conveniens Post-Owusu” (2006) 2 Journal of Private International Law 71 
and COM (2009) 174 FINAL, supra n 84, 5, 6. 
92 According to the Parliament and the Council, the Regulation is “overall considered to work successfully” 
(COM (2010) 748 final, supra n 83, 3. The Commission, on the other hand regards the Regulation as “highly 
successful”; COM (2009) 174 FINAL, supra n 84, 3; Hess, supra n 14 (cf at 1100). 
93 COM (2009) 174 FINAL, ibid at 2. 
94 COM (2010) 748 FINAL, supra n 83, at 3. 
chamber (or ‘hinge’ 95) of that structure. The Commission’s proposal sought (inter alia) to 
harmonise subsidiary jurisdiction via an emphasis on the connection a non-EU defendant 
has with the jurisdiction of the Member State in which proceedings are brought. 96 If the 
process of approximation of private international law rules requires adaptation of the 
Regulation’s underlying ‘philosophy’ (ie historically the systematisation of the original six 
Contracting States’ rules on recognition and enforcement) and doctrine 97   by the 
replacement of Member States’ subsidiary jurisdiction rules, on what basis could such an 
approach be justified?  
 
1. The Treaty Basis for the Commission’s Proposal 
If this aspect of the proposal is to be reignited at a later date, a key issue that remains to be 
fully established is the basis upon which the proposal to replace Member States’ subsidiary 
jurisdiction rules can be legitimised by the EU Treaty?98 Currently, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union affirms that competence may be either specific to the 
Union (Article 2(1)) or shared with the Member States (Article 2(2)).  In accordance with the 
Lugano Opinion, the extent of the Union’s exclusive competence may extend to, inter alia, 
“the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a 
legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.” 99  
What the proposal for the recast highlights is increasing “competence creep” 100 of the 
Commission to propose legislation over matters regarded as being traditionally the remit of 
the Member States’ internal rules and therefore external to the EU agenda. 
 
                                                          
95 Jenard-Moller Report, OJ 1990 C189/65; CMV Clarkson and J Hill, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 65. 
96 Weber suggests and applies the term “universal jurisdiction” in her analysis: supra n 37, 621, 623. 
97 Jenard-Moller Report, supra note 95. 
98 Fiorini, supra n 5, 984. 
99 Opinion 1/03, supra n 1. 
100 S Weatherill, “Competence Creep And Competence Control” (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 13 
referred to in L Niglia, “The “Rules” Dilemma—The Court of Justice and The Regulation of Standard Form 
Consumer Contracts in Europe” (2006/7) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 125; MW Hesselink, “The 
Common Frame of Reference as a Source of European Private Law” (2009) 83 Tulane Law Review 919, 963; 
Czepelak, supra n 3, 718-19.This is also a matter of current concern vis-à-vis the proposal for a Common 
European Sales Law ((COD) 2011/0284) on which see Kenny, Gillies and Devenney, supra n 22,  315-44. 
According to the Commission’s original proposal, the legislative basis for the proposal was 
grounded in accordance with Articles 67(4) and 81(2) (a), (c) and (e) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.  Article 81 is especially instructive.  The key difference 
between Article 81 and its predecessor Article 65 TEC is that the Union’s objective is to 
“develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, based on the 
principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such 
cooperation may include the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States.” 101  By relying on Article 81(2), the emphasis of the 
proposal to replace the Brussels I Regulation is five-fold. First, its purpose is “to develop 
judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications.” Second, it is required 
to meet the need for the “proper functioning of the internal market” (Art 81(2)). Third, its 
objective is to support the “mutual recognition of judgments” (Art 81(2)(a)). Fourth, it seeks 
to ensure “the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning 
conflict of laws and of jurisdiction” (Article 81(2)(c)). Fifth, it also seeks to improve “effective 
access to justice” (Art 81(2)(e)).  Building upon Dickinson’s valuable examination of the 
(then) proposals for the Rome II Regulation in the first volume of this Journal, it is useful to 
consider the extent to which each of these requirements necessitated the elimination of 
divergences in Member States’ subsidiary jurisdiction rules, by means of approximation of 
laws.   
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Judicial cooperation for Matters Having Cross-Border Implications: Ensuring Compatibility 
Through The “Internal Market Requirement”  
The application of Article 81 would appear to be non-contentious if it can be sufficiently 
demonstrated that the “aim and content of the measure” 102 proposed is required for the 
benefit of the internal market.  The general aim of the proposed Regulation is, inter alia, to 
                                                          
101 Article 81 TFEU, emphasis added. 
102 Dickinson, supra n 3, 215; cf Fiorini, supra n 5, 977 who raised the point that “…the lack of uniform 
definition may raise important difficulties in the practical application of related instruments”. 
abolish Member States’ procedures for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments. The proposal explained, inter alia, the need to re-align subsidiary jurisdiction 
rules, once external to the scope and objectives of the Community legal order, and 
approximate those rules with existing jurisdiction rules in the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
In an article in this Journal, Dickinson examined the basis of the “internal market 
requirement”103 for the proposed Rome II Regulation. In accordance with Article 65 TEC and 
the Tobacco Advertising decision on what is now Article 114 TFEU, a proposed measure has 
to either “remove(…) appreciable existing restrictions”, “prevent(…) likely future restrictions 
on the exercise of the (…) fundamental freedoms,” or “remove(…) appreciable distortions on 
competition within the internal market.”104  Each of these requirements are subject to what 
Dickinson coins “an internal substantive proportionality requirement,” ergo Stone’s 
“sufficient connection” 105 with the internal market.  A shift in emphasis occurred after the 
Amsterdam Treaty as a result of Article 65 TEC/81 TEFU, bringing matters which would have 
potentially been dealt with under Article 95 TEC/114TFEU 106 firmly within the remit of the 
former.  As Bariatti affirms, Article 81(2) TFEU is concerned with “guaranteeing th(e) 
effective implementation” 107  of measures for judicial cooperation in civil matters. 
Accordingly, the shift in emphasis moved from respecting pluralism and “promoting” 
compatibility of “divers(e)” 108 rules to “ensur(ing)” 109 the compatibility of jurisdiction rules 
through the process of approximation.  
 
Crucially Article 81 TFEU, unlike Article 65 TEC, does not require that any legislation made 
under that Article is “necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”. The 
removal of the “necessity” of this condition was achieved by the introduction of the words 
“particularly when” prior to “necessary”.110 
 
                                                          
103 Dickinson, supra n 3, 211. 
104 Ibid, 216, words modified for syntax and emphasis added. Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament 
and Council [2000] ECR I-8419. 
105 Stone, supra n 2 (2006 edition), 4. 
106 Israël, supra n 3 and Dickinson, supra n 3, 217. 
107 Barriatti, supra n 12, 7. 
108 COM 2010 (748) FINAL, supra n 83, 3. 
109 Draft Recital 3, COM 2010 (748) FINAL, ibid, 13. Word modified for syntax and italicised for emphasis. 
110 See Beaumont and McEleavy, supra  n 26, 73-74 and 607-608. 
 (b) Is the Harmonisation of Subsidiary Jurisdiction Rules Necessary for Mutual Recognition 
and Access to Justice? 
The objective of both the original Brussels I Regulation (and its predecessor) is that there 
ought to be the same approach to the recognition and enforcement of judgments across the 
Member States, to remove diversity of approach for the benefit of parties operating from 
within the internal market.  As Kruger has advocated, whilst the “flaw” in these instruments 
was the “imperfect” approach in excluding subsidiary jurisdiction, “rectification” of the 
Brussels I Regulation in her view “should never be done at the expense of litigating parties 
[…] domiciled in other parts of the world, of courts of third states, or of comity and justice.” 
111  What requires to be demonstrated is the economic necessity112 of such proposals for the 
benefit of EU citizens and businesses contracting within and external to the EU.113  As 
alluded to earlier in this article, in order to justify a limitation on state sovereignty, 
measures such as those in the Commission’s proposal must – as Mills points out - arise as a 
consequence of the “’natural’ evolution towards a common position.” 114  Given the Council 
of the European Union’s recent rejection of the Commission’s proposal to create 
harmonised subsidiary jurisdiction rules, political convergence to a common position is a 
long way off. Nevertheless, the legal justification for such a proposal may be found in Article 
81. Specifically, Article 81(2) TFEU allows for an argument that the creation of harmonised 
subsidiary jurisdiction rules is required for improving access to justice across the Internal 
Market.  The initial proposal for the Brussels I Regulation was similarly based on access to 
justice grounds in order to “facilitate closer cooperation between the Member States”.115 
During the negotiations for the original Brussels I Regulation, Beaumont highlighted that for 
the “sound operation of the Internal Market” to operate vis-à-vis disputes internal to the EU, 
“clear rules on jurisdiction […] rapid procedures and legal certainty [were] of the 
                                                          
111 Kruger, supra n 69, 405. On the role of the English Court of Appeal to consider comity in determining 
whether an anti-suit injunction over proceedings in a third state should be overturned, see the recent decision 
Star Reefers Pool Inc v JFC Group Co Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 14 analysed in R Fentiman, “ Anti-suit Injunctions – 
Comity Redux?” (2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 273. 
112 Mills, supra n 1, 178-79. Word in quote added. 
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114 Mills, supra n 1, 187. 
115 H Kortenberg, “Closer Cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam” (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 
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essence…”116 As the Nuyts report demonstrated, the varied spectra of subsidiary jurisdiction 
rules are evidenced by numerous factors. For example, such factors may include the 
(exorbitant) basis for the particular jurisdiction rule and the interests117 represented by 
them. The influence of the Brussels I Regulation itself may be relevant factor. 118 Other 
factors include the form, scope and relationship of these rules with the internal laws of the 
Member State concerned, in particular their constitutional laws, procedural rules and 
(particularly in the case of new candidate countries) compliance with bilateral conventions.  
The effectiveness of subsidiary jurisdiction rules are also heavily influenced by the 
connecting factors used to establish jurisdiction (rendering them exorbitant or otherwise), 
any power vested in the court to grant jurisdiction over a non EU defendant as well as their 
corresponding relationship with rules for the enforcement of judgments from third state.  
Despite a degree of influence of the Brussels I Regulation, the variety of subsidiary 
jurisdiction rules reignites the wider question of the appropriateness of those rules and of 
the double system of direct jurisdiction. Whilst the Nuyts Report affirmed the potential for 
subsidiary jurisdiction rules to restrict the application of EU law, it also acknowledged that 
concerns regarding the enforcement of EU law have been limited in practice.  Nevertheless 
the need to assure mutual recognition will, over time, require a permanent change in 
attitude 119 towards law making and interpretation 120 of cross-border matters that remain, 
both in territorial and membership terms, inherently external to the EU. 
 
2. Content of The Commission’s Original Proposal 
 
(a) Synopsis of The Green Paper  
A number of Recitals in the Green Paper set out the proposals for the replacement of 
Member States’ subsidiary jurisdiction rules. In seeking to extend the “close link between 
the court and the action,” 121 Recital 13 of the Green Paper stated that the defendant should 
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still be able to reasonably foresee which court of a Member State can assert jurisdiction 
over him.  Recital 16 of the Recast proposed by the Commission set out that “to promote 
the interests of claimants and defendants and promote the proper administration of justice 
within the Union,” 122 only Union rules should apply to defendants domiciled in third States. 
Recital 17 of the Green Paper continued that the basis of the Regulation “should therefore 
establish a complete set of rules on international jurisdiction of the courts in the Member 
States.” The Recital continued that “(T)he existing rules on jurisdiction ensure a close link 
between proceedings to which this Regulation applies and the territory of the Member 
States which justifies their extension to defendants wherever they are domiciled.” 123  The 
reference to domicile in the proposal continued in line with the existing Articles 59 and 60, 
namely that the internal laws of the Member States determine whether a natural person is 
domiciled in a Member State for the purposes of the jurisdiction regime provided by the 
Regulation and a broad, uniform definition of domicile for legal persons is provided.124 
 
(b) Direct Jurisdiction Rules over Non-EU Defendants in an EU Instrument 
The Commission’s proposal sought to extend the basis for Member States to assert 
jurisdiction over non-EU defendants in the scope of Brussels I. The starting point of this 
aspect of the proposal was Article 4(2) (ex Article 3, Brussels I Regulation).  Article 4(2) 
proposed that a party who is not domiciled in a Member State could be sued in a Member 
State in accordance with Sections 2 to 8 of Chapter II.  With regards to Section 2 of Chapter 
II, Article 5 proposed to allocate jurisdiction in matters relating to contract, tort, etc 
irrespective of where a defendant was domiciled.  With regard to Article 6, only a slight 
change of emphasis was offered which proposed that a defendant could be sued as a 
multiple party to proceedings brought in the courts of a Member State, provided he was 
domiciled in a Member State.  The proposed Article 23 on exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
would have applied in exactly the same way regardless of where the parties were domiciled. 
125   
 
                                                          
122 Recital 16, Green Paper, ibid. 
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124 Case C-327/10 Hypotecní banka, a.s. v Udo Mike Lindner, [2011] ECR I-0000, judgment of 17 November 
2011; Case C-292/10 G v Cornelius de Visser, [2012] ECR I-0000, judgment of 15 March 2012. 
125 Article 23 (1), COM (2010) 748 FINAL, supra n 83, 32. 
There were also two proposals which would have introduced specific categories of 
jurisdiction new to the Brussels I Regulation. Both categories were contained in Section 8 of 
Chapter II.  It is worth examining each in turn and considering the implications.126  If a 
claimant was not able to bring a non-EU defendant into the Brussels Regime by virtue of the 
rules in Articles 2 to 24 (ie exclusive jurisdiction, submission, a jurisdiction agreement, by 
connection to a contract, tort, etc or via a particular category of “protected” 127 contract), 
Article 25 would have enabled the courts of a Member State to assert jurisdiction instead if 
the defendant had property located in a Member State. 128  The connecting factors required 
to establish jurisdiction under Article 25 were that the value of the property had to not be 
disproportionate to the value of the claim and that the dispute had to have a sufficient 
connection with the Member State. However, if the matter arose, who would have attested 
to the value of the property?  In the interests of fairness and expediency (and to avoid 
speculative or vexation claims), a court appointed expert would have been required.  The 
criteria used to determine how a dispute was to be regarded as localised in a Member State 
also required clarification. In the absence of the use of both personal connecting factors 
such as domicile, habitual residence or nationality and a lack of jurisdiction under Section 2 
of Chapter II, a particularly defined, autonomously interpreted connecting factor based on 
economic criteria to ensure a close connection between the dispute and the defendant’s 
(commercial) property would have been required in order to establish jurisdiction. Such a 
definition would have depended upon an appropriately constructed preliminary reference 
to the Court of Justice.  
 
The proposed second category was contained in Article 26. This Article would have 
equipped Member States with a form of discretionary jurisdiction, applicable on an 
exceptional basis (forum necessitatis).  Article 26 had similarities with the “escape clause” 
contained in Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation.  Article 26 proposed that by way of 
exception, if no Member State court has jurisdiction (by virtue of the earlier provisions 
referred to) a Member State may assert jurisdiction. This proposed basis of jurisdiction was 
discretionary, and would have been subject to two conditions. The first condition required 
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127 Stone, supra n 2 (2006 edition), 113. 
128 Ibid, 46-47. 
there to be a question of either “the right to a fair trial or the right to access to justice” to 
justify jurisdiction under Article 26. The second requirement was that the dispute must have 
“a sufficient connection with the Member State of the court seised” (emphasis added).  At 
first reading, Article 26 might have offered some glimmer of hope to those Member States 
seeking to preserve an element of discretion in determining whether jurisdiction should be 
established over non-EU domiciled defendants.  A number of key issues remained to be 
resolved. The subsequent deletion of this Article in the European Parliament’s Report 
avoided having to address them.   
 
The first key issue was the standard to apply. For example, if the approach of Article 4(3) of 
the Rome II Regulation was to be followed, Article 26 would have been subject to a high 
threshold test. 129 The second issue concerned the wording of Article 26, which appeared to 
suggest that having already been ‘seised’ of a dispute (supporting mutual trust between the 
Member States) the underlying objective was to determine on what basis a Member State 
court should retain or decline jurisdiction?  The third issue was how were the rights to a ‘fair 
trial’ or to ‘access to justice’ in a Member State, compared to a non-Member State, to be 
objectively assessed?  The ‘fair trial’ option would tend to suggest a direct comparison 
between the EU acquis on the one hand and an objective, qualitative assessment of the 
public policy of a non-Member State on the other. 130   
 
Even if an assessment of public policy of competing jurisdictions can and ought to be 
considered at the jurisdiction stage, how would fairness have been assessed? Was it to be 
assessed from the perspective of the claimant (EU based or otherwise) who seeks to 
establish Article 26 as a basis of jurisdiction? Alternatively, was it to be assessed from the 
perspective of the non-EU defendant who would have been potentially subject to Article 26 
jurisdiction? Or, in the spirit of forum conveniens, would a balance of fairness test have been 
required? The ‘access to justice’ option sought to support a right to access substantive EU 
law as opposed to the law of a third State. Such an option may have led to an (indirect) 
comparison between the potential application of the substantive rules of a non-Member 
                                                          
129 JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North and Fawcett’s Private International Law (Oxford University 
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130 Petrov and Kalichenko, supra n 35. 
State on the one hand and EU law on the other for the purposes of bringing a claim that 
might not have overcome the jurisdiction hurdle under subsidiary jurisdiction rules.  There 
are two ways in which the fair trial or access to justice requirement may have been satisfied.  
The requirement may have been satisfied if it was neither reasonable nor possible to bring 
proceedings in a third State.  Alternatively, the fair trial/access to justice requirement may 
have applied if it could be reasonably anticipated that a judgment from a third State “would 
not be entitled to recognition and enforcement in the Member State of the court seised 
under the law of that State.” 131  The justification for this was the preservation of the 
claimant’s rights.   
 
At the time of writing, the subsequent deletion of Article 26 from the proposed Recast 132 
puts subsidiary jurisdiction rules firmly back in their place. A further question was what 
objective criteria would have been used to assess the extent to which a dispute had a 
sufficient connection with a Member State?  In the absence of a connection via an exclusive 
jurisdiction, submission, a jurisdiction agreement, contract (protected or otherwise), 
agency, tort, or indeed the defendant having property in the jurisdiction, would the 
defendant’s presence at the issue of proceedings be both appropriate and sufficient?  The 
final issue that arose from this proposal was what objective criteria were to be used in order 
to assess whether, under its current law, a Member State would not recognise and enforce a 
third state judgment, to permit jurisdiction by Article 26(b)? Again, even if such a proposal 
had been adopted (or if it is subsequently re-introduced), a high threshold test would have 
to be applied to maintain a reciprocal respect for values embedded in national conflicts 
rules. 
 
3. Towards the Final Version of the Recast: The Status Quo for Subsidiary Jurisdiction Rules 
(a) The Views of the European Parliament and Council Expressed 
In its Draft Report on the proposal, the European Parliament recommended the deletion of 
Recital 16 of the Regulation, arguing that the “Commission has no mandate” to pursue this 
                                                          
131 Article 26, word italicised for emphasis. 
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“premature […] step without wide-ranging consultations and political debate.” 133  The 
European Parliament were also not in favour of the basis for Recital 17 of the Green Paper, 
arguing that in the absence of “quantitative evidence that the existing divergences between 
the national laws … lead[s] to distortions of competition [and] significant losses for 
consumers …” 134  the proposal “…does nothing to improve the position of non-EU 
defendants.” 135 In comparison to other highly significant aspects of the proposals in the 
Recast (namely the abolition of exequatur and improving choice of court agreements) 136 the 
proposal to replace subsidiary jurisdiction remains on politically thin ground. Just as the 
Commission’s argument for the necessity of the Rome II Regulation was scrutinised by 
Dickinson, the arguments presented by the Commission vis-a-vis the proposal to amend 
subsidiary jurisdiction rules in line with the Brussels I Regulation must be scrutinised further.  
 
 
 
(b) Endorsement of The European Parliament’s Approach 
On 15 October  2012, the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs issued a further 
Report. 137 This Report contains the version of the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation. The 
Report formed the basis of a first reading which received endorsement by the Council of the 
European Union in late October 2012. Significantly, the European Parliament’s Report 
demonstrates a clear   shift in rhetoric vis-a-vis subsidiary jurisdiction rules from imminent 
138 to incremental change.  For example, Recital I explains how “certain [provisions] [...] in 
the interests of clarity” required amendment to “further facilitate the free circulation of 
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judgments [and] enhance access to justice.” 139  In Recital 2, reference is made to the 
“gradual establishment” 140 of an area of freedom, security and justice. Recital 11(f) is also 
instructive. In that recital, the European Parliament seeks to “introduce […] partial reflexive 
effect” 141, by enabling EU consumers to bring proceedings under Article 16  in the courts of 
their domicile 142  regardless of the domicile of the defendant business. As far as subsidiary 
jurisdiction rules are concerned, subject to the introduction of such reflex effect for 
consumer and employment contracts, Article 4(a) of the final version of the Recast 
preserves the status quo. Article 88(1) of the most recent Amendment also proposes that 
Member States would be required to intimate which of their rules apply against defendants 
domiciled in a non-Member State. 
 
Before (or indeed if) the proposal to approximate subsidiary jurisdiction rules is reignited, 
more research is required on the actual volume and economic value of cases brought before 
the courts of Member States on the basis of both the Brussels I Regulation and subsidiary 
jurisdiction rules. According to the Commission’s earlier report in 2009 on the application of 
the Regulation throughout the EU, “the jurisdiction rules generally apply in a relatively small 
number of cases, ranging from less than 1% of all civil cases to 16% in border regions.” 144  s 
far as the replacement of national subsidiary jurisdiction rules are concerned, two key 
questions persist. . First, what is the inherent value of both the Brussels Regime and 
subsidiary jurisdiction rules to commercial litigation in the courts of Member States? 
Second, are subsidiary jurisdiction rules causing such problems for EU citizens in being able 
to access justice that approximation of such rules is necessary? 
 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS: BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD? 
1. The Harmonisation of Subsidiary Jurisdiction: A New Form of Justice Pluralism? 
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142European Parliament Report, n 38 supra at 44. Article 15 applies regardless of whether a contract was 
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The Commission’s original proposal to replace national subsidiary jurisdiction rules where 
the defendant is connected to a ‘third’ (non-EU Member) with approximated rules highlights 
the future potential for a much wider “re-conceptualisation” of national private 
international law as EU law.  As Furrer reminds us, 
“(A)re we confronted with a new ‘meta-level’ in conflict of laws, or do we need 
special priority-based conflict of laws provisions in order to regulate the relationship 
between international and national law?” 146 
 
The gradual approximation of private international law seeks to coordinate conflicts justice 
in a manner and purpose distinct from national notions of conflicts justice. It does so by 
different means and processes and for different political objectives.  Having considered the 
original proposal to replace subsidiary jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation, 
Europeanisation by way of approximation (if politically desired) could have a larger impact. 
Such an impact may – in the longer term - result in the notion of conflicts justice shifting 
away from national interests and concepts of justice fostered through unity of result and 
justice pluralism to a more nuanced, particularised approach in pursuit of mutual trust 
achieved through “uniformity of decision.” With the EU focussing on survival, the proposals 
for the revision of the Brussels I Regulation are relevant to the continued attractiveness of 
Member States’ commercial courts to defendants located within and external to the EU.. 
The approach at EU level is indicative of the preference to sustain mutual trust and the 
recognition and enforcement of private rights (at Mills’ level of “secondary ordering”). 
 
 
2. Underlying Fundamental Concerns 
In his recent monograph International Commercial Litigation, Fentiman indicates at least 
four key areas of concern which must continue to be considered “in the debate about the 
future of the regime.” 147  Underpinning each of these questions is the emphasis on the 
practicalities 148 of cross-border litigation, ie what are the inherent risks and how can the 
modification of existing rules, ergo re-conceptualisation of conflicts justice, sufficiently 
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address those risks?  The first – and overarching - question Fentiman poses is, in ensuring 
approximated ‘access to justice’ for claimants, whether (in the long term) the status quo 
should prevail (combined approach) or should subsidiary jurisdiction be excluded (unified, 
minimised 149  approach)?  An answer to this holistic question has been sought by 
considering the necessity for approximation through the Treaty.  Whilst Furrer questioned 
the “underestimat(ion)” 150 of national law in supporting the application of EU law, in a post-
Lisbon Europe and until such approximation measures are complete, subsidiary jurisdiction 
rules remain inherently – and rightly -  “directed by national interests.” 151  Second, must the 
claimant be domiciled in a Member State?  The answer to that depends on if and how the 
claimant’s domicile can be extended beyond special or exclusive jurisdiction.  In accordance 
with the Brussels I Regulation, 152 the Court of Justice’s decision in Group Josi,153 the 
Commission’s proposal and the latest European Parliament Report, the claimant’s 
connection to a Member State is applied as a connecting factor 154 rather than a discrete 
basis of jurisdiction. 
 
Third, Fentiman questioned that if existing rules are to be adapted, 155 what changes are 
needed?  The third question focuses on the changes to include non EU defendants in 
Sections 2 and 3 of the proposed Regulation.  As discussed earlier, the shift from mutually 
expressed necessity to the approximation of laws appeared to provide the Commission with 
the necessary Institutional justification for the changes it was proposing.  To some extent 
light can be shed on the policy development of these questions in the Fourth and Fifth 
Options in the Nuyts report and the Green Paper.  The Nuyts Report commented that since 
the Jenard Report, the objective of the EU has shifted considerably ie that there is a need 
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and a willingness to modify internal rules of jurisdiction, irrespective of the impact on “the 
(domestic) norms that [national] judges and lawyers are used to apply[ing].” 156  Whilst the 
reference to “familiarity” 157 with EU law is insightful about the role and purpose of the 
Brussels I Regulation, it should not in itself form the basis of replacing national subsidiary 
jurisdiction rules.  Instead, it is the extent to which the Treaty permits such adaptation 
which is, in turn, reflected by the willingness of Member States to relinquish competence in 
support of the Union legal order.  Furthermore, since “no tremendous change” 158 is likely to 
occur in the current EU political climate, it is submitted that at any level a change in the 
inherent value of conflicts justice will continue to take place  in an incremental fashion.  The 
Nuyts Report reminds us that just one Member State (Italy) has adapted its subsidiary 
jurisdiction rules to mirror the current version of the Brussels I Regulation. Again, this alone 
is not enough to justify whole-scale replacement of subsidiary jurisdiction rules and 
traditions for the sake of the Internal Market and businesses operating in Europe.  The 
Provisional Conclusion in the Nuyts report affirmed that the “existing rules of jurisdiction 
usually ensure themselves a strong connecting link with the Union which justify their 
application to non-EU domiciliaries.” 159  However, it is submitted that the connection 
between the two aspects – link with the Community and application of existing rules to non 
EU domiciliaries – can only be justified on the grounds of legal necessity for optimal 
integration whilst ensuring that any future jurisdiction rule similar to one premised on 
forum necessitatis does not (highlighting Kruger’s concern) become an exorbitant rule at the 
supranational level. 
 
The impact of Europeanisation has been attributed to “the spread of European values, in the 
sense of unifying European legal cultures.” 160 As Joerges has attested, the process by which 
Europeanisation has occurred necessitates – and thereby facilitates – increasing awareness 
161 of its impact upon both European citizens and parties external to Europe. 162  Whilst the 
extent of structural change has created new forms of institutional governance and policy-
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making within the European Union, it is the second of Dyson and Goetz’s six forms of 
Europeanisation which has the most resonance for the future of national private 
international law rules. The most prevalent and far-reaching effect of Europeanisation is “as 
the exporter or transfer of European models outside Europe’s borders.” 163  During the stage 
of the proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, Justin Newton wrote that it was a “bold and 
decisive legislative statement” 164 and insightfully observed that  
“(T)he exact repercussions of this shift of legislative emphasis to a Regulation may be 
hard to predict: it may be imperceptible, or far-reaching, again depending on how 
the Brussels Convention was viewed.” 165 
 
As recent events illustrate, 166 the final version of the proposed Recast of the Brussels I 
Regulation is not likely to replace Member States’ subsidiary jurisdiction. At this time, the 
extension of harmonised jurisdiction rules applicable to disputes involving a non-EU 
defendant remains “incremental rather than revolutionary.”167  Despite lucid concerns 
about the effect of Europeanisation on litigation strategies and the “erosion” 168 of the 
“adjudicatory” 169 role of the national court as a consequence of the slight further erosion of 
national rules and the consequent changes to court procedures, national courts and the 
CJEU in particular will be take on an even greater “instrumental [and] institutional” role in 
interpreting future provisions.170  All of us with an interest in international litigation have 
much to learn from both the emerging legislative process and interpretative approaches171 
that will be applied (in the short and longer term) to the future regime.  Given the lack of 
desire to achieve political uniformity and continuing economic crises in numerous Member 
States, political convergence remains an elusive concept.  In its place, efforts at securing 
legal approximation of Member States’ laws via the Treaty remains the only form of 
Europeanisation broadly acceptable to (and thus far intended by most) Member States. 172  
However, it is clear that the Commission’s proposal to fully harmonise subsidiary jurisdiction 
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rules, in the words of Lord Mance, goes beyond what is (currently) necessary to ensure 
“certainty, confidence and allegiance.” 173 
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